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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO




SECRET1. CONGO (KINSHASA)

The mutiny of Katangese troops in Kisangani has exposed once again the weakness of the Congolese Army and the central government's tenuous control of the eastern Congo. Premier Mulamba reportedly has negotiated a cease-fire in Kisangani, but it is still doubtful that he can make it stick, much less that he can go on to end the mutiny (see map).

Unless President Mobutu can bring the Kisangani situation under control, there may be attempts by other regions to break away from Kinshasa.

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Belgium apparently has pulled back from a plan to notify the Congolese on 4 August of the termination of all bilateral conventions between the two countries. Nevertheless, given the deep mutual distrust and increasing vituperation in the Congolese and Belgian press, it seems almost certain that relations between the two countries will continue to deteriorate.


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SUDAN



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2. SUDAN

A new coalition government has been formed in Khartoum, but recently elected 30-year-old Premier Sadiq al-Mahdi will face major obstacles as he attempts to solve the Sudan's deep-rooted problems.

Sadiq was elected to replace his Umma Party colleague Mohammed Mahjoub by an overwhelming majority vote in the Constituent Assembly last week after months of political paralysis in Khartoum. Mahjoub, however, apparently retains the support of the Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi, spiritual leader of the conservative rural Islamic Ansar sect which forms the Umma's power base.

The urban-based National Union Party (NUP), the Umma's coalition partner, has agreed to participate in a new government under Sadiq's leadership. However, an Umma split might well inspire the erratic NUP leadership to demand a larger voice in policy making and prolong the government's ineffectiveness.

The major problem confronting the new government remains that of somehow reaching a political settlement with leaders of the Negroid separatist movement in the country's three southern provinces. Sadiq and some of his comparatively liberal Umma backers have expressed a fairly realistic view of the problems involved in integrating these provinces with the Arab north or of reaching agreement on some form of federation. However, the gulf between north and south remains almost unbridgeable, and any progress will be slow (see map).

Sadiq has also expressed ambitious plans for projects such as combatting the present Communist domination of the Sudanese labor movement, overcoming the nation's critical economic problems, and broadening the base of the Umma by expanding urban and liberal support for the party. However, Sadiq is as yet untested as a leader. He must take a firm hold on the reins of power, and is the only leader in sight who has any real prospect of doing so.

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3. URUGUAY

National Council of Government President Heber is making key military appointments which could assure him of some military backing should he decide to supersede the Council and concentrate power in his own hands.

Heber has forced through a number of appointments and promotions of controversial officers who support his faction of the governing Blanco Party and are noted for their close personal loyalty to him. However, their presence in key positions would not necessarily guarantee the support of the majority of the security forces should Heber decide to act.

The Uruguayan military has only limited political power and prestige. It traditionally has been aloof from politics, although twice in this century (1933 and 1942) it has stood aside to permit coups by incumbent presidents. Officers are unlikely to initiate a coup but some might well support one by a strong political leader.

There are several contingencies that might cause the mercurial Heber to act--which he could do with little or no warning. He might move if constitutional reform appears balked (27 August is the deadline for putting it on the ballot), if the Blancos seem unlikely to win November's general elections, if there is another major economic crisis, or if labor agitation gets out of control.


Communist leaders reportedly believe chances of such right-wing seizure of power are rapidly increasing. Although the Communist Party is encouraging agitation by public and private employees for compensation in line with the soaring cost of living, it is acting with restraint in order not to provoke a strong government reaction or furnish a pretext for a coup.

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4. THAILAND

No significant new insurgency activity has been reported following a rash of small attacks against government troops in northeastern Thailand last month. However, a report that North Vietnam is providing direct guerrilla training to the insurgents indicates that the Communists are laying the groundwork for a more concerted armed effort.

The government is continuing to mount large-scale suppression operations, but with uncertain results. Troops which recently completed a sweep in Patthalung Province in the south failed to establish any significant contacts. In the northeast Ubon Province, where the insurgency has been strongest, a 1,500-man security operation is under way

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There have been previous reports of North Vietnamese troops in the northeast, but their presence has never been verified.

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Deputy Premier Praphat apparently is exaggerating reports of North Vietnamese involvement for domestic political reasons. He told the press last week that documents found on two persons killed in recent skirmishes "proved" North Vietnamese "soldiers" have been infiltrating. This followed other public remarks indicating he is pushing for yet another postponement of a new constitution and elections on the grounds that the security situation precludes political liberalization.

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